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SUBJECT: AFGHAN POLICE: ANAP/ABP TRAINING SURGE UPDATE

REF: A. KABUL 1030
[1](#)B. 07 KABUL 3848
[1](#)C. 07 KABUL 3054

Summary

[1](#)1. In the onward press of the Focused District Development (FDD) program to train and equip the Afghan National Police (reftels), the network of police-training facilities has been running at full capacity. Most of the network capacity of about about 3,500 spaces is now dedicated to FDD-related training; however, other training imperatives remain, particularly 1) transitioning Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) into the regular police force before the ANAP program expires on October 1, 2008; and 2) training up units for the undermanned Afghan Border Police (ABP). To reach those goals, the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has initiated a training surge, accommodated at a range of temporary sites. The surge represents a short-term solution until the National Police Training Center is opened in Wardak Province later this year. The intent of this effort is to facilitate FDD while transitioning as many of the 5,000 ANAP as possible over to the regular police force by October 1. It is also to improve the quality and quantity of the ABP, currently manned at 65 percent, in particular on the Pakistani border. In early May, Emboffs visited Nangarhar Province to assess the training surge's progress.

Introduction

[1](#)2. Defeating the Afghan insurgency requires both a strong Afghan National Army and capable Afghan National Police (ANP) corps. In December 2007, CSTC-A embarked on the Focused District Development (FDD) program, a country-wide police training program to train and equip the ANP, district by district, within five years. Along with FDD, CSTC-A is executing the 2007-08 ANP training surge, which focuses on the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP). The ANAP were established in 2006 as a temporary program to field additional police units rapidly to high-threat

districts, mainly in the south and east. Although many ANAP slots were never filled, and while these lightly-trained police are of unreliable quality, local commanders and governors rely upon them in the absence of other forces.

¶3. Within the broader effort to reform and professionalize Afghan police, transitioning as many of the 9,318 serving ANAP as possible into regular police service is imperative. Although efforts are under way to fill all of the 82,000 authorized ANP positions with new recruits, the ANAP represent an existing pool of recruits that already has some policing experience. ANAP troops receive a scant two weeks of basic training, whereas AUP basic training consists of an eight-week course followed by sustainment training. (For comparison, the basic course for what is considered the best of ANP, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), is 16 weeks.) Since the ANAP program is scheduled to end on October 1, 2008, individual ANAP patrolmen must either complete a three-week sustainment training course to qualify for transition to the AUP or ABP or they will be removed from the police payroll. CSTC-A will ensure that ANAP in FDD-targeted districts receive the necessary training and equipment to make the transition, but ANAP in other districts must complete their training elsewhere if they wish to remain in the force. The training surge is also targeted at the ABP, who remain under authorized strength. For the moment, ANAP and ABP training takes place principally at selected, existing Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and other facilities on a space-available basis. DynCorp mentors under contract to INL oversee instruction, which is administered by certified

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Afghan trainers.

¶4. By the end of the ANAP program on October 1, 2,480 ANAP are targeted to receive the eight-week basic course along with the rest of the AUP units in their district, thus bypassing surge training altogether. These ANAP may transition straight into AUP without completing the sustainment course, as long as they meet all other program requirements. ANAP in districts targeted by FDD after October 1, if they receive the three-week sustainment course and fulfill other program requirements, may remain on the job until the FDD program reaches their districts. As of May 18, 1,790 ANAP had completed the three-week sustainment training and another 628 additional ANAP are currently in sustainment training. That leaves an estimated 5,048 additional ANAP still to be trained. (NOTE: Confirming accurate numbers for ANAP remains difficult and is being addressed in the context of overall payroll reform efforts. In any event, many ANAP patrolmen will choose not to join the AUP, and a number will likely be unqualified to transition to the ANP. END NOTE.)

¶5. The ABP is approximately 70 percent manned, with 12,761 of 18,003 positions filled. 648 ABP are scheduled to graduate from basic training by July 26, and 124 will complete advanced training by June 2. FOB Hughie in Nangarhar Province is one of the 16 FOBs nationwide that was selected to host surge training. It is located near Highway 1, which runs from the Torkham Gate in the east, past FOB Hughie and through the provincial capital of Jalalabad. About 290 ABP personnel are currently receiving basic training at this FOB, and Emboff spoke with several who expressed satisfaction with their instructors and the quality of the course. CSTC-A is responsible for providing life support and for ensuring that the facilities are properly equipped and supplied, while DynCorp mentors under contract to INL oversee instruction by Afghan instructors.

¶6. As with other programs, implementation under conditions experienced in Afghanistan poses severe challenges and requires creative teamwork. Local Afghan contractors provide uneven quality in food delivery and construction; latrine, sink and shower units have not held up well under the troops' daily use. ABP unit commanders, based a few miles away in

the provincial capital of Jalalabad, have provided limited support; however, on the day we visited, an ABP two-star general was on hand to address pay issues for the troops. Although DynCorp mentors visit the FOB each training day, the ANA unit that secures the FOB is unable to provide secure overnight billeting for these mentors. While the ANA troops remain on hand to provide security, the lack of overnight supervision for trainees has left them vulnerable to disciplinary issues. Mentors have expelled two trainees for violations of the drug policy but cannot block after-hours access for those individuals. The Ministry of Interior dispatched a partial complement of trainers on time, but the U.S. team has struggled to keep the course on track pending the uncertain arrival of remaining instructors.

Comment

17. Despite these challenges, the training surge is contributing toward the transitioning of ANAP to regular police service while providing much-needed training to the ABP. Lessons learned will probably lead to a reduction in the overall number of training sites. Ultimately, planners aim to complete ANAP training by September 1 in order to allow a thirty-day cushion to pick up stragglers and complete administrative processing before the ANAP program expires. This training surge will preserve the joint U.S. and Afghan investment in these troops -- and reduce the numbers who transition to local militias or other unwelcome outcomes.
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